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Summary
After substantial congressional entreatment, President George W. Bush gave
impetus to the creation of a Department of Homeland Security when, on June 6,
2002, he proposed the establishment of such an entity by Congress.  At the time, bills
to mandate a department were pending in both houses of Congress, the Senate
legislation having been recently ordered to be reported from committee.  The
President’s action was viewed as an effort to move beyond the coordination efforts
of the Office of Homeland Security, established by E.O. 13228 of October 8, 2001,
to a strong administrative structure for managing consolidated programs concerned
with border security and effective response to domestic terrorism incidents.
On June 18, the President  transmitted to the House of Representatives proposed
legislation to establish a Department of Homeland Security.  It was subsequently
introduced by request (H.R. 5005).  According to a legislative strategy announced by
Speaker Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, the House would
begin working with this proposal on an expedited basis.  Plans called for an initial
review and modification of the administration bill by the Committee on Government
Reform and other panels having jurisdiction over homeland security matters,
followed by a similar review and refinement of the measure by an ad hoc select panel
under the leadership of Majority Leader Dick Armey.  The bill would then be sent to
the House floor for final action.  The Senate elected to work with the department bill
(S. 2452) sponsored by Senator Joseph Lieberman.  The resulting House and Senate
bills would then be reconciled in conference.
As these legislative developments occur, primary issues for Congress and the
President are what should be the program composition, administrative organization,
and management arrangements of the new department.  Other issues include what to
do with non-homeland security programs proposed for transfer to the department,
personnel costs that may arise from pleas for pay equity among investigative and
inspection positions within the department, reconsideration of the relationship of
intelligence entities to the department, intelligence analysis by the department, and
implementation of the transition to the new department.  This report will be updated
as events recommend.
Contents
Department Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Departmentalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Homeland Security—Coordination Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Homeland Security—Initial Department Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Homeland Security—Markup of Department Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Homeland Security—Floor Action on Department Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Adequate Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Inappropriate Program Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Administrative Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
General Management Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Human Resources Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Personnel Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Defining Intergovernmental Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
S. 2452 (Lieberman)/H.R. 4660 (Thornberry) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
H.R. 5005 (Armey) (by request) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Related CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
List of Tables
Table 1.  Federal Executive Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2.  Primary Components Transferred to the Department of 
Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Table 3. Officials Reporting Directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security . . 20
1See Federal Register, vol. 66, Oct. 10, 2001, pp. 51812-51817.
2Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 147, Oct. 11, 2001, p. S10646.
3Elizabeth Becker, “Domestic Security: Bush Is Said to Consider A New Security
Department,” New York Times, Apr. 12, 2002, p. A15.
4See Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 148, May 2, 2002, pp. S3874-S3880.
Homeland Security: 
Department Organization and Management
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the term homeland security came to be used in public
parlance as a reference to American efforts at combating terrorism.  To coordinate
these efforts, President George W. Bush established, with E.O. 13228 of October 8,
2001, an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the Executive Office of the
President and a Homeland Security Council (HSC), under his chairmanship.1  He also
appointed an Assistant to the President for Homeland Security to direct OHS, and
shortly thereafter, on October 29, the President inaugurated Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, which, while somewhat similar to executive orders, are not
published in the Federal Register.
While these events were transpiring, more elaborate organization designs for
realizing and maintaining homeland security began to appear.  On October 11,
Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) introduced a bill (S. 1534) for himself and Senator
Arlen Specter (R-PA) establishing a Department of National Homeland Security.
The head of the new department, who would be a member of the Cabinet and the
National Security Council, “would have the rank and power,” said Senator
Lieberman, “to ensure that the security of our homeland remains high on our national
agenda, and that all necessary resources are made available toward that end.”2  In
brief, this official would be the principal administrator of homeland security
programs and operations.  By contrast, the director of OHS is a coordinator of
homeland security policy, administration, and operations.  Six months later, after the
director of OHS had become embroiled in controversy over his declining to appear
before congressional committees to discuss his activities, the director of the Office
of Management and Budget reportedly said that President Bush might be interested
in the departmental option as a solution to the issue of a presidential adviser, which
is one of the roles of the OHS director, testifying before congressional committees.3
On May 2, Senator Lieberman introduced an expanded version of his initial bill (S.
2452) for himself, Senator Specter, and Senator Bob Graham (D-FL).  A companion
bill was offered in the House that same day by Representative Mac Thornberry (D-
TX) for himself and six cosponsors.  The legislation would mandate both a
Department of National Homeland Security and a National Office for Combating
Terrorism within the Executive Office of the President.4
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5For the President’s remarks, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 38,
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7See 1 Stat. 239; the line of succession is currently specified at 3 U.S.C. 19.
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President Bush gave impetus to creation of a Department of Homeland Security
when, on June 6, 2002, he proposed the establishment of such an entity by Congress.
The President’s action was viewed as an effort to move beyond the coordination
efforts of the Office of Homeland Security, established by E.O. 13228 of October 8,
2001, to a strong administrative structure for managing consolidated programs
concerned with border security and effective response to domestic terrorism
incidents.5
On June 18, the President  transmitted to the House of Representatives proposed
legislation to establish a Department of Homeland Security.  It was subsequently
introduced by request (H.R. 5005).  According to a legislative strategy announced by
Speaker Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, the House would
begin working with this proposal on an expedited basis.  Plans called for  an initial
review and modification of the administration bill by the Committee on Government
Reform and other panels having jurisdiction over homeland security matters,
followed by a similar review and refinement of the measure by an ad hoc select panel
under the leadership of Majority Leader Dick Armey.6  The bill would then be sent
to the House floor for final action.  The Senate elected to work with the department
bill (S. 2452) sponsored by Senator Joseph Lieberman.  The resulting House and
Senate bills would then be reconciled in conference.
Department Tradition
Within the federal government, the departments are among the oldest primary
units of the executive branch, the Departments of State, War, and the Treasury all
being established within a few weeks of each other in 1789.  The heads of the
departments are the members of the traditional Cabinet; since 1792, they have, by
statutory specification, constituted a line of succession, after the Speaker of the
House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, to the presidency in the event of
a vacancy in both that office and the vice presidency.7  The Constitution is referring
to these officials when it authorizes the President, in Article II, section 2, to “require
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”  In brief, they and
their organizations are the administrative arms of the President.8
The departments were the preeminent administrative entities of the executive
branch throughout most of the 19th century.  The creation of the U.S. Civil Service
Commission in 1883 inaugurated the tradition of enduring independent
agencies—i.e., nondepartmental entities with a degree of independence from
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presidential supervision—followed by the launching of independent regulatory
bodies in 1887 with the Interstate Commerce Commission.  In many regards, the
departments have remained “the most prestigious of the organizational types” of the
executive branch, currently being 14 in number.9
Table 1.  Federal Executive Departments
Department Creation Modification
State 1789
War 1789 Subsumed by Defense
Treasury 1789
Navy 1798 Subsumed by Defense
Interior 1849
Justice 1870
Post Office 1872 Reorganized as U.S. Postal Service
Agriculture 1889
Commerce and Labor 1903 Labor later separated
Labor 1913













When does departmentalization occur?  What factors contribute to the creation
of a new federal department?  Several considerations can be offered in response to
these questions.  Departmentalization involves the thematic consolidation of existing
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11Ibid., p. 31.
12Ibid.
13See Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization” in Luther Gulick and L.
Urwick, eds., Papers on the Science of Administration (New York: Institute for Public
(continued...)
programs and entities in a single, hierarchically organized, administrative structure.
These components may be modified during the transfer process, and new programs
may be created and assigned to the new department as well.  Departmentalization
also serves to strengthen presidential management of  program administration by the
new department, and emphasizes the importance of these collective programs for the
nation.  Finally, departmentalization occurs because it has the political support of
relevant interest groups that regard the change as beneficial in terms of proximity to
the President and national prestige.
Three years after launching the New Deal to realize the economic recovery of
the nation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1936, organized the President’s
Committee on Administrative Management to assess and make recommendations
concerning, among other matters, the role of the President in the managerial direction
and control of all executive branch departments and agencies and the streamlining
of the executive branch, which counted a number of temporary, experimental, and
redundant component entities.  Reporting in January 1937, the committee recounted
the evolution of the executive branch, finding that it had “grown up without plan or
design like the barns, shacks, silos, tool sheds, and garages of an old farm.”  This led
the panel to conclude that the “structure of the Government throws an impossible
task upon the Chief Executive,” with the result that: “No President can possibly give
adequate supervision to the multitude of agencies which have been set up to carry on
the work of the Government, nor can he coordinate their activities and policies.”10
To rectify this situation, the committee recommended, in part, increasing the number
of Cabinet departments from 10 to 12, and requiring and authorizing “the President
to determine the appropriate assignment to the 12 executive departments of all
operating administrative agencies and fix upon the Executive continuing
responsibility and power for the maintenance of the effective division of duties
among the departments.”11  In brief, in the hierarchical model recommended by the
panel, as many of the executive administrative agencies as possible would be
transferred to one of the departments and become subject to the supervision of the
head of the department.  These department heads, in turn, would be subject to the
direction of the President.  Implementation of these recommendations, said the
committee, would “make effective management possible by restoring the President
to his proper place as Chief Executive.”12
Underlying the work of the committee regarding these matters was a theory of
organization developed by one of the panel’s principal members, Luther Gulick, a
proponent of orthodox or classical organization doctrine derived largely from
business administration and the scientific management movement of the early 20th
century.13  Schuyler Wallace, who had been a member of the staff of the President’s
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Administration, 1937), pp. 1-45.
14For critiques of, and alternatives to, orthodox organization theory, see Warren G. Bennis,
Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human Organization
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Bertram M. Gross, The Managing of Organizations: The
Administrative Struggle, vol. 1 (New York: Free Press, 1964); Daniel Katz and Robert L.
Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966);
Douglas McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); John
D. Millett, Organization for Public Service (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1966);
William G. Scott, Organization Theory: A Behavioral Analysis for Managers (Homewood,
IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1967); Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York:
Macmillan, 1957); Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State (New York: Ronald Press,
1948); Stephen J. Wayne, The Legislative Presidency (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).
15Schuyler Wallace, Federal Departmentalization: A Critique of Theories of Organization
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 43.
Committee on Administrative Management, expanded upon many of Gulick’s views
in his 1941 assessment of federal departmentalization.14  Of particular interest are his
proffered considerations which enter into the construction of a department.  Among
the first of these are quantitative considerations.  Beginning with the President, he
comments “that the boundaries of a chief executive’s span of control cannot be easily
ascertained and described in a mathematical formula of universal applications.”15
History records that the traditional Cabinet has grown from six members in 1789
(including three heads of departments), to nine members in 1900 (including eight
heads of departments), to 15 members in 2002 (including 14 heads of departments).
Since the presidency of John F. Kennedy, other officials, such as the ambassador to
the United Nations,  have been appointed with Cabinet rank, meaning that they attend
Cabinet meetings and otherwise receive related documents.  By regulating the
number of officials appointed with Cabinet rank, the President may exert some
restraint upon the size of this body.  Furthermore, he may use other specialized
forums, such as the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council,
to exercise managerial control of selected department heads.
Similarly, since 1929, when the President’s staff was increased from a single
personal secretary to three such aides and an administrative assistant, the White
House staff has grown to supplement the Chief Executive’s span of control over
departmental management.  When making a plea for such increased staffing in 1937,
the President’s Committee on Administrative Management famously asserted:
The President needs help.  His immediate staff assistance is entirely inadequate.
He should be given a small number of executive assistants who would be his
direct aides in dealing with the managerial agencies and administrative
departments of the government.  These assistants, probably not exceeding six in
number, would be in addition to the present secretaries, who deal with the public,
with the Congress, and with the press and radio.  These aides would have no
power to make decisions or issue instructions in their own right.  They would not
be interposed between the President and the heads of his departments.  They
would not be assistant presidents in any sense.  Their function would be, when
any matter was presented to the President for action affecting any part of the
administrative work of the Government, to assist him in obtaining quickly and
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17Wallace, Federal Departmentalization, p. 48.
18See Herbert Kaufman with Michael Couzens, Administrative Feedback: Monitoring
Subordinates’ Behavior (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973).
19Regarding this consideration and much more, see Jane E. Fountain, Building the Virtual
State: Information Technology and Institutional Change (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 2001).
without delay all pertinent information possessed by any of the executive
departments so as to guide him in making his responsible decisions; and then
when decisions have been made, to assist him in seeing to it that every
administrative department and agency affected is promptly informed.  Their
effectiveness in assisting the President will, we think, be directly proportional to
their ability to discharge their functions with restraint.  They would remain in the
background, issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public statements.  Men
for these positions should be carefully chosen by the President from within and
without the Government.  They should be men in whom the President has
personal confidence and whose character and attitude is [sic] such that they
would not attempt to exercise power on their own account.  They should be
possessed of high competence, great physical vigor, and a passion for anonymity.
They should be installed in the White House itself, directly accessible to the
President.  In the selection of these aides, the President should be free to call on
departments from time to time for the assignment of persons who, after a tour of
duty as his aides, might be restored to their old positions.16
By 1947, White House Office staff numbered over 200, and would be twice that
number by the end of the century.  Along the way, the President would appoint a
chief of staff to help him manage his retinue of personal aides who strengthen his
span of control over department management.
Wallace also observed that, “just as there are limits to the chief executive’s span
of control, so also are there limits to the control which can be exercised by any of his
subordinates.”17  For the head of a large department, such limits include his or her
span of control, or how many officials are routinely reporting directly to him or her.
It also includes contending with excessive layers of middle management or an
abundance of management control positions, which can contribute to a sluggish
administrative system and delayed system outcomes.  Other limits may include lack
of administrative feedback arrangements for monitoring subordinates’ behavior;18
inadequate information technology applications to supplement hierarchical
communications structures for effective staff edification, guidance, and
development;19 and insufficient planning capability for forecasting new challenges,
developing departmental goals and performance measures, and instilling a sense of
mission unity.  Regarding this last consideration, experience with the early Policy
Planning Staff of the Department of State is worth recalling.  The group, composed
of senior department staff, was hurriedly put together in late April 1947 to assist
Secretary of State George C. Marshall with quickly developing recommendations for
addressing the economic and political crises mounting in war-ravaged Europe.  “The
staff did so,” observed one analyst, “making a central contribution to what was soon
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W. Norton, 1969), p. 214.
22Wallace, Federal Departmentalization, pp. 62-63.
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dubbed the Marshall Plan.”20  Marshall’s successor, Dean Acheson, described the
intentions of the former Army Chief of Staff when creating this planning entity.
The General [as Marshall was often called] conceived the function of this group
as being to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the
operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough
ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be
done to meet or anticipate them.  In doing this the staff should also do something
else—constantly reappraise what was being done.  General Marshall was acutely
aware that policies acquired their own momentum and went on after the reasons
that inspired them has ceased.21
Returning to Wallace’s observations on departmentalization, he commented:
there is no assurance ... that the creation of large departments will lead to an
extension of the career systems upward.  In the opinion of opponents of this
method of administrative integration, the contrary may well be the case.  The
very size of the department will make the problem of civilian control over the
bureaucracy appear to be a more difficult one.  This will undoubtedly be seized
upon by advocates of democratic control and by spoilsmen as an excuse to push
the system of political appointment downward rather than the merit system
upward.22
This matter also has implications for the control which can be exercised by the
head of a large department over his or her organization.  If middle and upper
management positions are largely political appointees, the head of the proposed
department may have the experience of dealing with highly transitory strangers of
varying competence who were, for the most part, unilaterally selected by the White
House.  By contrast, filling middle and upper management positions with career civil
servants has somewhat greater potential generally for realizing more enduring,
knowledgeable, and capable departmental leadership, even though cases may result
where a careerist fails to perform management responsibilities adequately.
Turning to “the determination of the criteria by which the subordinate
administrative units should be grouped together in a departmental structure,” Wallace
proffered “that the process of departmentalization rests upon four major concepts of
organization: (1) function; (2) work processes; (3) clientele; and (4) territory.”  He
quickly cautioned that “these several modes of organization may seem to be self-
evident, yet such is far from the case,” and proceeded to demonstrate that these are
not clearly understood concepts.23  Furthermore, he admitted:
No one has ever advocated the construction of departments solely upon the basis
of function, or work processes, or clientele or territory.  Instead, in the very
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nature of things, functional, technical, clientele, and territorial factors enter into
the construction and operation of all national or large-area departments.  Such
considerations vary from division of work to division of work, and practice and
common sense take them into account as existing departmental organizations
demonstrate.  Back of all technical considerations, however, lie large questions
of national policy and purpose which have a bearing upon present practices and
proposed innovations.  Given a particular set of assumptions respecting public
policy—e.g., the desirability of maintaining constitutional government, the
normal judicial processes, legislative control over the administration, etc.—the
problem then is the emphasis which should be laid upon one relevancy rather
than another, i.e., function, clientele, etc., in a given social context and the
particular devices which can be adopted to offset any disadvantages to efficiency
accruing from a given emphasis.24
“The most widely utilized basis of departmental integration,” he continued, “is
that of function or purpose,” defined as “the grouping of subordinate administrative
units in a departmental pattern upon the basis of the underlying purpose to which they
each have been dedicated.”  Reliance upon work processes involves “the bringing
together in a single department ... those who have had similar professional training
or who make use of the same or similar equipment.”  Departmentalization based
upon clientele “should result in the concentration in a single department of those
subordinate administrative units which are designed to serve some particular segment
of the body politic.”25  Finally, departmental organization may be “based upon place
or territory,” and “has long been used as a basis of interdepartmental organization,”
such as in the regional divisions of the Department of State.26
While these concepts were offered as bases for departmental integration,
Wallace also made mention of “another principle of administrative organization, that
of devolution of operating autonomy.”
This is best exemplified in the realm of economic organization by the holding-
company mode of organization.  Instead of concentrating full and final authority
in the hands of a single executive, holding companies usually organize their
component parts more or less as independent economic units, in many cases
directed by independent presidents, immediately responsible to independent
boards of trustees.  In all such holding companies some measure of coordination
is imposed, but the techniques by which it is achieved differ radically.  In some
situations the board of directors of the top holding company constitutes a
majority of the board of directors of each of the operating units.  In other cases,
the chief executives of the various operating units report directly to the president
of the top company.  But in any case, devolution rather than integration is the
outstanding characteristic of these economic units.  The actual administration and
management of the various operating organizations is under the direction and
supervision of its immediate management.  Such coordination as exists, apart
from financial and certain technical considerations, is confined to broad
questions of business policy or to that limited sphere in which it is thought either
that standardization of procedure is imperative or that the overall facilities of the
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parent organization make possible a contribution of administrative efficiency not
otherwise attainable.27
A few years after the publication of Wallace’s departmentalization study, the
creation to two new massive federal departments gave particular credence to some
of his observations.
Department of Defense
In the aftermath of World War I, the establishment of a Department of National
Defense, unification of the armed forces, and the creation of an independent Air
Force began to be discussed in various quarters in the United States.  Sometimes
these issues dramatically captured public attention, perhaps no more so than in the
fall of 1925 during the court martial of Colonel Billy Mitchell.  Congress began
exploring these matters in early 1944.28  Subsequently, proposals for a central
intelligence agency and improved arrangements for the mobilization of war resources
were added to the debate, and an elaborate plan, embracing all of these considerations
in fulfillment of “national security,” was offered by Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal.29  This plan was largely enacted with the National Security Act of 1947,
which created the National Military Establishment, headed by the Secretary of
Defense and embracing, as subunits, Army, Navy, and Air Force departments; the
Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Council; and the National Security
Resources Board.30  Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense.  In 1949, based
upon his experience, he proposed amendments to the National Security Act, which
Congress adopted, strengthening the supervisory authority of his position and
changing the name of the National Military Establishment to the Department of
Defense.31
Creation of the National Military Establishment/Department of Defense had
been under consideration in Congress for approximately three years and ultimately
came to be guided by a plan of some detail.  Establishment of the new department
involved very few agencies: the Department of War became the Department of the
Army, but the U.S. Army Air Forces were transferred to the new Department of the
Air Force, and the Department of the Navy, like the other two armed services
departments, came under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense.  In 1946, the
House and Senate had collapsed their defense-related committees into single armed
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services panels in each chamber, and the new department largely fell within their
legislative and oversight jurisdiction.32
In 1941, Wallace had recognized that a Department of National Defense might
be established on an integrated basis, with a strong head supervising subordinate
leaders of the armed services components or, alternatively, on a devolution basis,
following the holding company model.  Discussing this latter version, he wrote:
It would certainly embrace two component parts—a Division of War and a
Division of Navy.  It might also embrace a Division of Military Aviation.  Each
of these great divisions might be headed by its own secretary and might remain
practically autonomous in the conduct of its own internal affairs.  Above the
three secretaries might be placed a secretary of National Defense.  His primary
function might be, first, the reception of routine reports from the two or three
major divisions as the case might be, and the transmission of such segments of
these reports as he might think necessary to the chief executive, and second, the
coordination of the overlapping activities of the component parts of the
department. ... Moreover, he might undertake certain military activities now
carried on by neither the Department of War nor that of the Navy, or certain
functions such as propaganda which are in reality not a technical part of the
fighting service.33
This arrangement, of course, was rejected in the National Security Act of 1947,
but the matter of which model to adopt would be revisited six years later in the case
of another new department.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Created in 1953 by reorganization plan, the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare was rooted in the social welfare administration of the New Deal, the
Social Security Board and the Federal Security Agency being primary components.34
The President’s Committee on Administrative Management had recommended
establishing a Department of Social Welfare in 1937, and may have envisioned its
accomplishment through a presidential reorganization plan.35  However, the initial
statute authorizing the President to propose reorganization plans—the Reorganization
Act of 1939—prohibited the use of this method to establish any new executive
department.36  Consequently, another strategy was followed, as Louis Brownlow, the
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chairman of the President’s committee and author of Reorganization Plan 1 of 1939
recounted in his memoirs.
Part 2 of Plan I set up a Federal Security Agency.  This was to take the place of
the department of social welfare that had been a feature of our original
recommendations.  Forbidden to create a department, “F.D.R.” created an
agency.  Forbidden to call its head a “secretary,” he called him an
“administrator.”  Forbidden to give a salary of $10,000 a year, equal to that of
members of the Cabinet and incidentally to that of members of the two houses
of Congress, he provided for the administrator a salary of $9,000 a year.
Actually, the Federal Security Agency became in everything but words a major
department of the government, although it was not until the early days of the
Eisenhower administration that it was set up as the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, and its administrator blessed with the title of
“Secretary.”37
Following the creation of the Federal Security Agency, attention continued to
be given to elevating its programs to departmental status and administration.  A
majority of the members of the first Hoover Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (1947-1949) recommended the establishment
of a department for education and social security programs, but would have returned
some Federal Security Agency responsibilities to the Department of Labor and
located federal health activities in a separate United Medical Administration.  Three
members of the panel dissented from this separation of health and welfare functions
and recommended a Department of Welfare which included health activities.38  A
Brookings Institution assessment of grouping health, education, employment, and
social security and relief functions in a single department, which was prepared for the
Hoover Commission, expressed reservations about this prospect:
department heads are usually laymen serving ordinarily for relatively short terms,
frequently with little prior experience in the substantive work of the department.
In the present instance the problems which will come to the President will
apparently lie in distinctly professional fields and deal with substantive matters
or broad issues of administration.  Only under exceptional circumstances could
a single department head deal competently with so diverse a range of technical
activities.  When the President has to consider substantive issues it would seem
entirely possible that he might get more help from several heads of smaller
departments than from the head of one big one because one could scarcely master
the details in a reasonable period.39
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President Harry S. Truman sent a reorganization plan to Congress in June 1949
for a Department of Welfare40 and another in May 1950 for a Department of Health,
Education, and Security.41  Both plans built upon the programs of the Federal
Security Agency.  Under the terms of the Reorganization Act of 1949, a plan could
be rejected by the adoption of a simple resolution in either house of Congress.42  The
President’s Department of Welfare plan was rejected in the Senate on a 60-32 vote
adopting a resolution (S.Res. 147) of disapproval;43 the Department of Health,
Education, and Security plan was rejected in the House on a 249-71 vote adopting a
resolution (H.Res. 647) of disapproval.44
On February 2, 1953, newly installed President Dwight D. Eisenhower, with his
party in majority control of both houses of Congress, announced in his State of the
Union message that he would shortly send to Congress “a reorganization plan
defining new administrative status for all Federal activities in health, education, and
social security.”45  The promised plan for a Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) was delivered on March 12.46  Support for the proposal was
sufficiently strong that Congress expedited approval and implementation of the plan
through the adoption of a joint resolution which the President signed into law on
April 1.47
The HEW plan had been prepared by Oveta Culp Hobby, whom Eisenhower had
named to head the Federal Security Agency.  A former commander of the Women’s
Army Corps who had served under Eisenhower in the European theater during World
War II and an ardent personal supporter of his presidential candidacy, she was
elevated to become the first head of the new department.  She made the plan as
simple as possible so as to avoid congressional disapproval, which meant little detail,
no vesting of the various legal authorities of the Surgeon General or the
Commissioner of Education in the new Secretary, and no transfers of organizations
or programs from other parts of the government.  It was initially proposed that the
head of the department would manage the organization with an under secretary and
three assistant secretaries, one each for the primary health, education, and welfare
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components.48  This arrangement had the support of an important congressional
figure, Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH), who reportedly “thought this was a logical
division of responsibilities and would be conducive to good management.”
For quite different reasons, the American Medical Association and the various
national education associations also recommended separate assistant secretaries
for health, education, and welfare.  Each interest group thought that if it had an
assistant secretary to concern himself with its specific functions, he would
become an effective spokesman within the Administration for the group’s
interests.49
Analysts at the Bureau of the Budget (predecessor to the Office of Management
and Budget) opposed the assistant secretary trinity, “concerned that these three
appointees might become captives of the pressure groups and the bureaucracy,
working in league with one another, and told Mrs. Hobby that she needed some top-
level assistants to aid her in her job.”  Ultimately, the plan mandated two assistant
secretaries “to perform such functions as the Secretary may prescribe” and an
equivalent special assistant to the Secretary for health and medical affairs.  However,
the Secretary, nonetheless, “had a tiny staff of her own choosing and an unusually
small number of supporting civil servants,” as well as an unwieldy management
structure.50
At the time HEW officially came into being in 1953, the organization was no
infant.  It had over 34,000 employees with total expenditures of $5.4 billion,
including $2.0 billion in general funds and $3.4 billion in Social Security trust
funds.  It was clear that the Social Security program would grow steadily and
rapidly for many years, assuming the system was preserved in its form at that
time.  What was far less clear was how the other components of the Department
would change.  Nobody really realized how forces and events during the next
twenty years would throw one responsibility after another on the shoulders of the
young Department, straining its capacity to cope with all of its functions.51
When the department began operations, authority for its programs was not
clearly vested in the Secretary, which led to friction between the head of the
organization and subordinate leaders within the health, education, and welfare
components. Interest groups sometimes exploited the situation. The Secretary
seemingly did not have an effective management structure or adequate supporting
staff, the latter shortcoming contributing to the Brookings warning about the
manageability of a department dealing with so many distinct professional fields.  To
some, HEW appeared to be the “holding company” mode of organization described
by Wallace.  As late as July 1962, when he stepped down as the head of HEW in
order to run for the Senate, Abraham Ribicoff reportedly “complained that the
department was so large and so diverse as to be unmanageable.  After becoming a
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senator in 1962,” it was observed, “Ribicoff consistently supported legislation to
dismantle the department.”52
Creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had been under
consideration in Congress, at various times, in one way or another, for about a dozen
years, and ultimately came to be realized with a proposal of little detail.  As a result,
management arrangements were unwieldy.  Establishment of the new department
involved only the components of the Federal Security Agency.  The 1946
consolidation of congressional committees resulted in Senate panels on finance and
on labor and public welfare and in House panels on education and labor and on ways
and means, which would largely have legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the
programs of the new department.  However, because HEW had been established by
a reorganization plan, none of these committees had an opportunity to contribute to
the development of the initial operating arrangements of the new department.53
Homeland Security—Coordination Office
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W.
Bush issued E.O. 13228 of October 8 establishing the Office of Homeland Security
(OHS) within the Executive Office of the President.  Former Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Ridge was named to head the new entity and to serve, as well, as the President’s
principal adviser on homeland security.  “The mission of the Office shall be to
develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks,” said the executive order,
and “to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.”54  
Critics of OHS and Ridge’s role contended that the executive order did not give
him adequate authority, including remedial budgetary power, over agency efforts at
combating terrorism.  In response, Ridge said that his close proximity and easy access
to the President gave him all the authority he needed to do his job.  Some were not
convinced by Ridge and sought to reconstitute OHS with a statutory mandate and
more explicit responsibilities and powers.  Others favored a different course of
action,  consolidating relevant programs and hierarchical administrative authority in
a new department.  Among the first to pursue this approach was Senator Joseph
Lieberman, who introduced his initial proposal (S. 1534) a few days after the
establishment of OHS.  He and Representative Mac Thornberry (D-TX) would
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introduce more elaborate versions of this legislation (S. 2452 and H.R. 4660) in early
May 2002.55
By late January 2002, Ridge, according to the Washington Post,  was “facing
resistance to some of his ideas, forcing him to apply the brakes on key elements of
his agenda and raising questions about how much he can accomplish.”  OHS plans
engendering opposition from within the executive branch reportedly included those
to streamline or consolidate agencies responsible for border security; improve
intelligence distribution to federal, state, and local agencies; and alert federal, state,
and local officials about terrorist threats using a system of graduated levels of
danger.56
At about this same time, Ridge began to become embroiled in controversy over
his refusal to testify before congressional committees.  Among the first to request his
appearance were Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) and Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK),
respectively, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Appropriations.  Ridge turned down their initial, informal invitation and later formal
requests of March 15 and April 4.57  When Ridge declined the request of
Representative Ernest Istook, Jr. (R-OK), chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, appropriations
for the Executive Office of the President were threatened, prompting Ridge to offer
to meet with Istook and other subcommittee members in an informal session.58
Thereafter, Ridge arranged other informal briefings with members of the House
Committee on Government Reform and a group of Senators, and agreed to a similar
such session with members of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
These informal meetings, however, did not appear to abate the controversy that
Ridge’s refusals to testify had generated.59
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Assessing the situation in early May, a New York Times news analysis proffered
that, “instead of becoming the preeminent leader of domestic security, Tom Ridge
has become a White House adviser with a shrinking mandate, forbidden by the
president to testify before Congress to explain his strategy, overruled in White House
councils and overshadowed by powerful cabinet members reluctant to cede their turf
or their share of the limelight.”  In support of this view, the analysis noted that the
Pentagon did not consult with Ridge when suspending air patrols over New York
City — a special assistant to the Secretary of Defense explained this action by saying,
“We don’t tell the Office of Homeland Security about recommendations, only about
decisions” — and the Attorney General unilaterally announced a possible terrorist
threat  against banks in April.60   Asked about this assessment by Jim Lehrer on the
PBS Newshour, Ridge called it “false” and said, “I just don’t think they have spent
enough time with me on a day-to-day basis.”61  Shortly thereafter, a New York Times
editorial opined that one of the reasons Ridge “lost these turf battles is that he failed
to build a constituency for change in Congress.  His refusal to testify before
Congressional committees has not helped.”62
Ridge’s problems had not escaped White House attention.  In his April 11
testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs concerning Senator
Lieberman’s proposal for a homeland security department, Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,
the director of the Office of Management and Budget, indicated that the President
might eventually decide to create the department as envisaged in the Lieberman bill.
In addition, Daniels said he would consider creating a working group with Senator
Lieberman to discuss the legislation.63  Subsequently, Daniels, Ridge, White House
Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr., and White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales
would constitute the principal members of a secret group that would begin drafting
the President’s departmental plan on April 23.  This proposal was unveiled on June
6, 2002.  The President’s surprise announcement was viewed not only as an attempt
to regain the initiative in the nation’s efforts at combating terrorism, but also to move
beyond the coordination efforts of the Office of Homeland Security to a strong
administrative structure for managing consolidated programs concerned with border
security and effective response to domestic terrorism incidents.  The President
transmitted a draft bill detailing his plan for the department on June 18, and it was
formally introduced (H.R. 5005) on June 24.64  An alternative model is provided by
Senator Lieberman (S. 2452) and Representative Thornberry (H.R. 4660), to create
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both a Department of National Homeland Security and a new Executive Office of the
President entity, the National Office for Combating Terrorism.
Homeland Security—Initial Department Bills 
By the time the President’s draft legislation was formally introduced, House
leaders had agreed that it would be the legislative vehicle for that body to develop a
mandate for a Department of Homeland Security.  According to the agreed-upon
plan, the bill would be referred to standing committees, which would (for
approximately two weeks) consider, modify as deemed appropriate, and report those
portions of the legislation within their jurisdictions.  The bill would then be referred
to a special committee on homeland security which, under the chairmanship of the
Majority Leader, would produce (after approximately three weeks) a version of the
legislation for floor consideration.
In the Senate, by the time the President’s draft legislation was unveiled, Senator
Lieberman’s second bill (S. 2452) to establish a Department of National Homeland
Security  had been ordered to be reported, with amendments, from the Committee on
Governmental Affairs.65  It was determined that this measure would be the legislative
vehicle for the Senate to develop a mandate for a Department of Homeland
Security.66  The resulting Senate-passed bill and the counterpart approved by the
House would then be sent to conference for reconciliation, and that version of the
legislation would be considered by each house.
At the outset, the House and Senate bills differed in some major regards.  The
House bill would transfer approximately two dozen primary components to the new
department; the Senate bill would transfer one-third of these primary components.
Table 2 generally reflects these comparative differences.
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Table 2.  Primary Components Transferred 
to the Department of Homeland Security
House Bill 
(H.R. 5005, as introduced)
Senate Bill 
(S. 2452, as initially reported)
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (DOA)
Animal and Plant Health Inspection





















U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Customs Service U.S. Customs Service





Computer Security Division (NIST)




Federal Computer Incident Response
Center (GSA)
Federal Protective Service (GSA)
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (DOE)




(H.R. 5005, as introduced)
Senate Bill 
(S. 2452, as initially reported)
National Communications System
(DOD)
National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center (DOE)
Nuclear Incident Response (DOE)
Office for Domestic Preparedness
(DOJ)
Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Public Health Emergency
Preparedness (HHS)
Plum Island Animal Disease Center
(DOA)
Select Agent Registration and
Enforcement Program (HHS)





DOA = Department of Agriculture
DOC = Department of Commerce
DOD = Department of Defense
DOE = Department of Energy
DOJ = Department of Justice
DOT = Department of Transportation
FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice
GSA = General Services Administration
HHS = Department of Health and Human Resources
NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology, Department of Commerce
The two bills also differed concerning the number and kinds of officials who
would be reporting directly to the head of the department.  The House bill identified
as many as 12 officers who seemingly would be reporting directly to the Secretary,
while the Senate bill identified half as many such officials.  However, the Senate bill
made no reference to three positions—general counsel, Chief Financial Officer, and
Chief Information Officer—specified in the House bill.  Table 3 generally reflects
these comparative differences.
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Table 3. Officials Reporting Directly 
to the Secretary of Homeland Security
House Bill 
(H.R. 5005, as introduced)
Senate Bill 
(S. 2452, as initially reported)
Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary
Under Secretary for Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate of Critical Infrastructure
Protection
Under Secretary for Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures
Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security
Directorate of Border and
Transportation Protection




Under Secretary for Management
Director of the Office of Science and
Technology
Inspector General Inspector General
Commandant of the Coast Guard
General Counsel
Director of the Secret Service
Chief Financial Officer
Chief Information Officer
The House and Senate bills also reflect major differences regarding related
components.  The House bill would create only a new department and presumes the
continued existence of the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council established by E.O. 13228 of October 2001.  It is likely that, if the new
department were established, an amendment to the executive order would
appropriately adjust the membership of the council.  The Senate bill, however, would
create a new department, make the head of the department a member of the National
Security Council, establish a National Office for Combating Terrorism within the
Executive Office of the President (presumably replacing the Office of Homeland
Security), and mandate a National Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security
Response Council to assist with the preparation and implementation of a national
strategy for combating terrorism and homeland security response (presumably
replacing the Homeland Security Council).  Creation of a National Office for
Combating Terrorism poses a question as to the head of that entity, who would be
subject to Senate confirmation, also serving as the principal presidential adviser on
homeland security.  At present, the situation is reversed: the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, who is a member of the White House Office staff,
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also heads the Office of Homeland Security and had declined to appear before
congressional committees because he was a presidential adviser.
Concerning the need for both a homeland security coordinating office in the
Executive Office of the President and a department, Indiana University public affairs
professor Charles R. Wise has warned: “Combining an interagency coordinating role
with the role of leader of a major department inevitably will raise concern that the
head of the department is using the coordinating role to further the interests of his or
her own department and will undermine the coordinating position by fostering
perceptions of partiality.”67  Moreover, while the Secretary of Homeland Security will
be a major player in homeland security policy and practice, he or she is not the only
leader involved in these matters, and the efforts of the department must be
coordinated with those of other departments and agencies having homeland security
responsibilities.
Homeland Security—Markup of Department Bills
As the second week of July came to a close, the standing committees of the
House that had been considering the President’s proposal for a Department of
Homeland Security offered their recommendations for modifying the bill.  A few
committees indicated disagreement with some of the primary component transfers
(see Table 2) that would be made by the President’s legislation.  The Committee on
Armed Services recommended that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and
the Coast Guard remain in their current status, although some Coast Guard functions
were proposed for transfer.  The Committee on the Judiciary recommended
transferring only the Office of National Preparedness of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to the new department, not the entire agency; moving
only the enforcement responsibilities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to the new department and leaving the Service’s administrative duties with the
Department of Justice; and transferring the Secret Service to the Department of
Justice instead of the new department.  The Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure also proposed leaving the Coast Guard and FEMA in their current
status, and recommended that the newly established Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) be moved to the new department after TSA was fully
organized.  The Committee on Ways and Means urged keeping the revenue collecting
authority of the Customs Service at the Department of the Treasury rather than
transferring the whole agency to the new department.68
Not bound by these standing committee recommendations, the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security began hearings on the President’s proposal on July
11, receiving testimony from Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of Defense
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Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of the Treasury
Paul H. O’Neill.69  A July 9 discussion draft of substitute language to the President’s
proposal, released by the chairman of the select committee, added detail to the
pending legislation, but made no adjustment of the primary components proposed for
transfer to the new department.  A second discussion draft, very similar to the first
one, was released by the chairman on July 18; it was used by the select committee in
its July 19 markup, and the resulting legislation, as amended, was ordered reported
on a party-line vote at the end of the day.70
The House bill, as reported from committee, largely continued to reflect the
department component structure proposed by the President.  A notable exception in
this regard was transferring only the enforcement responsibilities of INS to the new
department and leaving its administrative duties with the Department of Justice.
Among the more contentious issues before the committee were civil service
protections for department workers and collective bargaining rights.  The bill
continued to vest broad authority in the Secretary regarding these matters.
Institutional additions to the legislation, as introduced (the President’s proposal),
include:
! a Special Assistant to the Secretary, appointed by the Secretary and
responsible for several specified communications, policy advice, homeland
security mission assessment, and partnership matters regarding the private
sector;
! a National Council of First Responders, composed of not less than 100
individuals appointed by the President for three-year terms and chaired by an
individual appointed by a Director of Homeland Security (not otherwise
identified in the bill), which is tasked with various information, education,
identification, and evaluation duties relative to first response matters and first
responders;
! a Privacy Officer, appointed by the Secretary by designating a senior
department official to assume primary responsibility for privacy policy,
including, among other duties, assuring that the use of information
technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections relating to the use,
collection, and disclosure of personal information; assuring full compliance
with the Privacy Act of 1974; evaluating legislative proposals involving
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by the federal
government; and conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules
of the department or that of the department on the privacy of personal
information, including the type of personal information collected and the
number of people affected;
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! an Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, headed by a director responsible
for reviewing and assessing information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil
liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling by employees and officials of the
department;
! an Office of International Affairs, established within the office of the
Secretary and headed by a director appointed by the Secretary, which shall
promote information and education exchange with nations friendly to the
United States in order to promote sharing of best practices and technologies
relating to homeland security; and
! a Homeland Security Council, established within the Executive Office of the
President with the President, Vice President, Attorney General, Director of
Central Intelligence, and Secretaries of Homeland Security, Health and
Human Services, Defense, the Treasury, State, Energy, and Agriculture as
members, to advise the President on homeland security matters; the staff of
the council are directed by a presidentially appointed executive secretary; the
council may be convened jointly with the National Security Council.
The number of Assistant Secretary positions to which the President makes
unilateral appointments was reduced from not more than ten, as proposed by the
President, to not more than eight; the number of such positions for which the
presidential appointment is subject to Senate confirmation was reduced from not
more than six to not more than four.  The provision in the House bill, as introduced,
authorizing the President, until the transfer of an agency to the new department, to
transfer to the Secretary amounts not to exceed five percent of the unobligated
balance of any appropriation available to such agency was adjusted, a two percent
ceiling being set for transfers for administrative expenses related to the establishment
of the department and a three percent ceiling being set for transfers for which the
funds were appropriated.  Similarly, the President’s proposal to allow the Secretary
to transfer between appropriation accounts upwards of five percent of any
appropriation available to such official in any fiscal year was reduced to upwards of
two percent.  The reported bill prohibited all federal activities to implement the
proposed Citizen Corps program known as Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information
and Prevention System), designed to recruit private citizens to report “suspicious”
activities of other individuals for collection in a centralized database.71  Another
provision specified that the legislation does not authorize the development of a
national identification system or card.  Finally, as noted below, although two
definitions of the homeland security concept were available to the select committee
at the time of its markup, the panel did not include any such explanation of the term
in the reported bill.
In related developments, on July 15, the Brookings Institution released the first
comprehensive critique of the President’s proposal, suggesting, among other
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considerations, that it “merges too many different activities into a single department,”
should leave science and technology research and development responsibilities for
later deliberation, and begs a rethinking of congressional committee arrangements.72
The following day, the President released the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, which offered a definition of homeland security that could be used in
determining the program composition of the new department. “Homeland security,”
it was stated, “is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage
and recover from attacks that do occur.”73  An alternative definition of homeland
security was offered in the marked-up version of the President’s proposal containing
the recommendations of the House Committee on Government Reform: “the
deterrence, detection, preemption, prevention, and defense against terrorism targeted
at the territory, sovereignty, population, or infrastructure of the United States,
including the management of the programs and policies necessary to respond to and
recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.”
In the Senate, the Committee on Governmental Affairs began a markup of the
Lieberman bill (S. 2452) on July 24, working with an amendment drafted by Senator
Lieberman.  The following day, the committee authorized the chairman to withdraw
the version of S. 2452 that had been amended and ordered favorably reported on May
22, then approved the modified amendment in the nature of a substitute to the text
of the bill.  The new version of S. 2452 included largely the same agencies and
programs in the Department of Homeland Security as were transferred by the House
bill.  Exceptions were the inclusion of the Computer Security Division of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Bioweapons
Defense Analysis Center of the Department of Defense, which the House bill did not
include.  By contrast, the House bill transferred the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory of the Department of Energy, portions of the Advanced Scientific
Computing Research Program of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
portions of the Chemical Biological Defense Program of the Department of Defense,
the Plum Island Animal Disease Center of the Department of Agriculture, and the
Domestic Emergency Support Teams of the Department of Justice, which the new
Senate bill did not include in the Department of Homeland Security.  Also, the House
bill transferred the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of
the Treasury to the Attorney General, while the Senate bill placed it in the new
department.
The newly amended version of S. 2452 also added most of the same senior
officials—a Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, General Counsel, and
Privacy Officer—included in the House bill.  It established six directorates within the
new department, including a large immigration directorate to which all of INS would
be transferred.  The House bill moved only the enforcement functions of INS to the
new department.  Like the House bill, the new version of S. 2452 removed critical
infrastructure information voluntarily shared by industry with the department from
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the information access arrangements of the Freedom of Information Act.  However,
unlike the House bill, the new Senate bill established a National Office for
Combating Terrorism within the Executive Office of the President, mandated a
national strategy for combating terrorism, and continued civil service protections and
collective bargaining rights for workers in the Department of Homeland Security.
In the closing days of July, the Senate, contending with a schedule somewhat
crowded with other pending legislation, delayed taking up the Department of
Homeland Security legislation until it returned in early September from a summer
recess.74
Homeland Security—Floor Action on Department Bills
The House began consideration of H.R. 5005, as reported by the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, on July 25, with debate extending into the late
night, the resuming the next day.75  Twenty-six amendments were in order for
consideration.76  Among those agreed to were amendments:
! establishing a Homeland Security Institute as a research and development
center;77
! requiring a plan within one year to consolidate and co-locate regional and field
offices in each city with existing offices transferred to the department;78
! establishing an office for state and local government coordination;79
! requiring biennial reports to Congress on the status of homeland security
preparedness, including an assessment for each state, and a report within one
year of enactment that assesses the progress of the department in
implementing the act to ensure that core functions of each entity transferred
to it are maintained and strengthened and recommending any conforming
changes in law necessary to the further implementation of the act;80
CRS-26
81Ibid., July 26, 2002, pp. H5800-H5804.
82Ibid., pp. H5809-H5813.
83Ibid., pp. H5817-H5829, H5837-H5838; the provisions, included in an en bloc manager’s
amendment, had been offered in H.R. 3844.
84Ibid., pp. H5854-H5861; many of the provisions had been offered in H.R. 4598, which was





! protecting the union rights of employees transferred into the department and
allowing the President to exempt applications where there would be a
substantial adverse impact on the department’s ability to protect homeland
security;81
! requiring collaboration with employee representatives in the planning,
development, and implementation of any human resources management
system;82
! strengthening security controls over information resources that support federal
operations and assets;83 and
! facilitating the sharing of security information among federal, state, and local
governments.84
Among the amendments rejected during the House floor debate were proposals:
! establishing the Office of Homeland Security statutorily with a director
appointed by the President with Senate approval;85
! retaining FEMA as an independent agency with responsibility for natural
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery;86
! preserving the Customs Service as a distinct entity within the Department of
Homeland Security;87
! protecting the rights of union employees who are transferred into the
department with the same job responsibilities as they had in their previous
organization;88
! striking section 761 of the bill, which establishes a human resources
management system and inserts various provisions, including the authority for
the director of the Office of Personnel Management to adjust pay schedules,
except that employees transferred to the Department of Homeland Security
may not have their pay reduced; provides for suspension and removal of
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employees in the interest of national security; and provides remedies for
retaliation against whistleblowers;89
! striking subtitle C of Title VII regarding voluntarily shared critical
infrastructure information; striking section 762 regarding advisory
committees; and inserting a new section dealing with remedies for retaliation
against whistleblowers;90 and
! defining the term “covered Federal agency,” for purposes of exemption from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, to mean the Department of
Homeland Security and agencies with which the department shares critical
infrastructure information.91
Concluding debate on July 26, the House voted 295-132 to adopt H.R. 5005, as
amended.
Issues
Proposals to create a Department of Homeland Security raise many issues, not
the least of which are threshold questions concerning the value of the new entity.
President Bush has contended that his proposal does not constitute an expansion of
the federal government, but merely consolidates existing programs within a more
efficient and effective management structure.  However, neither the President’s
proposal nor either of the principal congressional bills made use of a definition of the
concept of homeland security to guide the component composition of the new
department.  Moreover, whole agencies are being transferred to the department with
very little effort to sort out non-homeland security functions and programs for more
appropriate administration elsewhere other than the new department.  Of course,
attempts to sort out the homeland security programs of transferred agencies from
non-homeland security programs may result in increased cost for additional
administrative overhead.  Similarly, attempts at pay equity among the various
investigative and inspection personnel of the new department could also result in
unforeseen expense.  Some contend that the creation of any new department will
result in budget expansion.  In a July 9 cost estimate, the Congressional Budget
Office proffered that “implementing H.R. 5005 would cost about $3 billion over the
2003-2007 period,” which would be “in addition to projected net spending for
ongoing activities of the transferred agencies—about $20 billion in 2002, growing
to $31 billion by 2007.”92
There are, as well, those who doubt that merely rearranging programs within a
new department will truly improve the nation’s defense against terrorism.  Others
maintain that, no matter how well management and operating arrangements are fine-
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tuned, the effectiveness of the department and its leadership cannot be guaranteed.
And still others wonder aloud who will be willing to serve, for very long, in the
leadership of such a department.  Additional issues are discussed below.
Adequate Scope.  Some initially criticized the President’s proposal as an
inadequate response to what they viewed as intelligence failures, suggesting that, in
the context of considering the components of the new homeland security department,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the federal intelligence community,
particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), should not escape scrutiny.  Two
FBI units—the National Domestic Preparedness Office (15 employees) and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center (795 employees)—would be transferred to
the new department under the President’s plan.  The criticism, however, suggests that
those developing the President’s plan did not give adequate consideration to the
prospect of transferring or restructuring FBI and CIA counterterrorism
responsibilities, which Congress will have the opportunity to do.93  Others have
questioned why the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were not
included.94  GAO, among others, noted that, because the concept of “homeland
security” had not been defined, “certain organizational, management, and budgetary
decisions cannot currently be made consistently across agencies.”95  Although
definitions, as noted above, became available, the House select committee did not
include homeland security among the terms defined in the bill it reported and the
House approved in amended form.  The committee-modified Senate bill gives the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the director of the new National Office for
Combating Terrorism, in consultation with affected department and agency heads,
upwards of 270 days after the enactment of the Department of Homeland Security
legislation to develop definitions of “combating terrorism” and “homeland security”
and “shall consider such definitions in determining the mission of the Department
and Office.”
Inappropriate Program Transfers.  Some have noted that the transfer of
whole agencies to the new department would result in it being responsible for the
administration of programs having nothing to do with homeland security and which,
consequently, might not receive adequate resources for their execution.96  These
include the marine safety responsibilities of the Coast Guard, the drug and child
pornography interdiction efforts of the U.S. Customs Service, the counterfeiting
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detection and investigation program of the Secret Service and the research and non-
native plant and pest eradication efforts of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.  OHS Director Tom Ridge, in his June 20, 2002, testimony before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, acknowledged that the new department would
have a number of programs not directly related to countering terrorism, but did not
indicate any particular concern about this development.  Sorting out these programs
for continued administration by their parent departments is an option for Congress,
but may result in greater expense for the reorganization effort as administrative
structures and operating expenses are adjusted.  The House-approved bill largely
transfers whole agencies to the new department with little sorting out of non-
homeland security programs.  The committee-modified Senate bill also largely
transfers whole agencies to the new department, but requires an annual report, for the
five years following the transfer, to the Secretary, the Comptroller General, and
appropriate committees of Congress concerning mission performance, with particular
emphasis on the continued level of performance of non-homeland security missions.
Administrative Structure.  In creating the new department, Congress must
determine the appropriate administrative structure for the Secretary to manage, with
efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, an organization of possibly 170,000
employees (many of whom will be working in field facilities), composed of diverse
units, with shared responsibility and partnership with state and local governments as
well as the private sector.  This issue concerns the Secretary’s span of control over
the operations of primary divisions and internal agencies (e.g., U.S. Coast Guard and
U.S. Secret Service), together with such broad departmental functions as human and
information resources management, budget setting, and financial management.
Initial versions of both the House and Senate bills appeared to support strong vertical
management structures, and both were seemingly weak in detailing horizontal
working arrangements among headquarter’s divisions and internal agencies and
among field staff.  Under the bill adopted by the House, the Secretary of Homeland
Security may have as many as 15 senior officials of the department reporting directly
to him or her (or more if the Assistant Secretaries have this relationship).  Under the
committee-modified Senate bill, the Secretary may have as many as 17 senior
officials reporting directly to him or her.  Some have regarded the creation of the new
department as being analogous to the establishment of the Department of Defense
some 50 years ago, while others consider it to be similar to the more eclectic and
unwieldy Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of 1953.
General Management Requirements.  During the 20th century, Congress
enacted a variety of general management laws prescribing how federal departments
and agencies shall manage assets and resources, prepare budgets, engage in the
purchase of goods and services, and conduct regulatory activities and their
evaluation.97  Some of these laws are generally inclusive in their application—they
automatically apply to all departments and agencies unless otherwise excepted.
Others are explicit, requiring amendment in order for their provisions to be
applicable to specific departments and agencies.  In general, as the legislation
establishing a Department of Homeland Security has progressed in the House and the
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Senate, whether or not the application of these laws to the new department has been
systematically considered is not clear.  A case in point is the Government
Performance and Results Act (GPRA).98  The House-adopted bill does not explicitly
exempt the new department from GPRA, and the department’s large annual
budget—projected to be in excess of $20 million—may otherwise subject it to GPRA
requirements.  The committee-modified Senate bill also makes no explicit exemption
from GPRA requirements for the new department, but does provide some GPRA-like
results-based management obligations—a strategic plan, a performance plan, and a
performance report—for the department.99
However, there have been innovations.  Establishing a Privacy Officer within
the new department gained attention when, in testimony on July 9 before the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Mark
W. Everson, Controller, Office of Management and Budget, commented: “Although
the general counsel of an agency often handles privacy issues, we recognize the
special importance of these issues in the homeland security context and are
examining options for establishing a specialized privacy officer within the new
Department [of Homeland Security].”100  The Department of Justice has had such an
official since December 1998.  The House-approved bill  includes a Privacy Officer,
an addition to the legislation made by the Select Committee on Homeland Security.
The committee-modified Senate bill also provides for a Privacy Officer.
Human Resources Management.  While the President’s proposal would
have resulted in the transfer of almost 170,000 employees to the new department, the
initial version of the Senate legislation would have involved the transfer of about
119,500 personnel.  The President’s proposal contained a provision not included in
the initial version of the Senate bill authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in regulations prescribed jointly with the director of the Office of Personnel
Management, to establish and, from time to time, adjust a human resources
management system for some or all of the organizational units of the department,
“which shall be flexible, contemporary, and grounded in public employment
principles of merit and fitness.”  In testimony before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs on June 20, OHS Director Ridge indicated that the President
would request for the department “significant flexibility in hiring processes,
compensation systems and practices, and performance management to recruit, retain,
and develop a motivated, high-performance and accountable workforce.”
Government officials conducting a June 18 background briefing were reported to
have said that the Bush Administration’s legislation
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would allow employees to carry over their union affiliations and current pay rates
to the new federal agency.  Once the department is up and running, the secretary
would work with the Office of Personnel Management to develop personnel
rules.  The secretary would also eventually decide whether to continue providing
employees with union rights.101
The provision has raised various issues concerning staffing requirements, such
as adequate numbers of personnel and planning for the replacement of retiring staff;
hiring, particularly direct hiring which would not be merit-based and free of political
influence and otherwise devoid of preference for veterans; and pay, particularly pay
parity or equity for employees who are performing similar jobs.102  Civil service
protections and collective bargaining rights for department workers continue to be
among the most contentious issues surrounding the establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security.  The House-adopted bill supports the President’s position on
these matters, giving the Secretary considerable flexibility, while the committee-
modified Senate bill preserves the prior status of transferred workers in these regards
.
Personnel Cost.  The common location of investigative and inspection
personnel of such agencies as the Customs Service, Federal Protective Service,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Transportation Security Administration
within a new homeland security department may prompt calls for pay equity for these
positions.  Anecdotal accounts suggest that many of these investigative and
inspection personnel find the compensation arrangements for airport security
screeners prescribed by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act attractive.103
However, reliance on these arrangements to establish pay equity could contribute
significantly to the cost of creating the new department.  Pay equity may prove to be
an important issue for gaining the support of labor unions representing affected
government employees. These unions opposed the President’s department
proposal.104
Defining Intergovernmental Roles.  “The new department,” a GAO
representative noted in recent congressional testimony, “will be a key player in the
daunting challenge of defining the roles of the various actors within the
intergovernmental system responsible for homeland security.”  These actors include
state and local governments, as well as private sector organizations.  To “form
effective partnerships with nonfederal entities,” cautioned the GAO representative,
“federal initiatives should be conceived as national, not federal in nature.”
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Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also pose risks based upon the
different interests reflected by each partner.  From the federal perspective, there
is the concern that state and local governments may not share the same priorities
for use of federal funds.  This divergence of priorities can result in state and local
governments simply replacing (“supplanting”) their own previous levels of
commitment in these areas with the new federal resources.  From the state and
local perspective, engagement in federal programs opens them up to potential
federal preemption and mandates.  From the public’s perspective, partnerships
if not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public
programs.105
GAO has found that “a shift is potentially underway in the definition of roles
and responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments with far reaching
consequences for homeland security and accountability to the public,” with officials
at all levels of government rethinking “long standing divisions of responsibility for
such areas as fire services, local infrastructure protection, and airport security.”
These changes have implications for the working relationships that the new
department will have with subnational governments.  An important consideration, as
well, is the department’s ability to provide coordinated assistance to these
governments when a terrorist incident occurs.  The department may also require
special authority and arrangements, such as information protection, to gain the
confidence and voluntary cooperation of private sector entities in efforts at
maintaining homeland security and combating terrorism.106  “Some state and local
governments and private sector entities,” notes GAO, “are waiting for further
guidance on national priorities, roles and responsibilities, and funding before they
take certain additional action” regarding homeland security.107  The creation of a
Department of Homeland Security, as well as a national strategy for homeland
security, will seemingly contribute to the realization of such guidance.
Implementation.  Pivotal to the success of the new department will be the
implementation of the legislation creating it.  What will be the strategy and timetable
for selecting department leaders and putting them in place, connecting leaders and
workers through an electronic communications network,108 shifting components to
the new management arrangements, and putting other supporting administrative
mechanisms into operation?  What role should Congress play in these regards?
These considerations are complicated by the proposed department’s considerable
field operations, shared responsibility and partnership with state and local
government, as well as the private sector, and need not only to maintain continued
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vigilance regarding terrorist threats, but also to be continuously capable of
responding effectively to a terrorist incident.  A review of previous experience has
suggested that, in past “attempts at reorganization, serious concern with
implementation is typically too little and too late.”109  Consequently, as GAO has
reported, new and reorganized agencies experienced substantial startup
problems—delays in obtaining key officials prevented timely decisionmaking; delays
in obtaining needed staff impeded first year operations; insufficient funding
necessitated additional budget requests; and inadequate office space contributed to
inefficient handling of workload and morale problems.110  President Bush has sought
to address implementation concerns with  E.O. 13267 of June 20, establishing a
Transition Planning Office within the Office of Management and Budget to
“coordinate, guide, and conduct transition and related planning” for the new
department throughout the executive branch and to work, as well, with Congress in
this regard.111  The House-adopted bill requires the President to provide Congress
with a reorganization plan detailing the agencies, personnel, assets, and obligations
transferred to the new department, as well as any planned consolidation,
reorganization, or streamlining of transferred agencies.  The committee-modified
Senate bill indicates that transfers of agencies to the new department shall occur
when the President so directs.  Some have contended that these arrangements are
insensitive to congressional prerogatives and that implementation should occur in
organized phases through a series of presidential plans that become effective with
congressional affirmation.  Furthermore, because implementation will occur over
time, Congress must be prepared, organizationally and in other ways, to work with
the Secretary of Homeland Security in fine-tuning the organization, management, and
operations of the department.
Congressional Oversight.  By one estimate, “[a]t least 11 full committees
in the Senate and 14 full committees in the House—as well as their numerous
subcommittees—claim oversight or some responsibility for various U.S. programs
for combating terrorism.”112  In the House, the President’s legislative proposal was
referred to 12 standing committees deemed to have some jurisdiction over the
legislation.  These situations suggest that many House and Senate committees and
subcommittees may conduct oversight of the administration and operations of the
Department of Homeland Security.  However, they might also portend that such
oversight may be fragmented and narrow in scope, somewhat redundant, and of
questionable effectiveness.  Moreover, oversight panels may experience other
competing demands on their time and resources for conducting such proceedings.
Among the options open to the two houses of Congress are: (1) continue with the
status quo; (2) reassign oversight responsibilities to a smaller number of standing
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committees; (3) reassign oversight responsibilities to a single new standing
committee in each house (such as was done over 20 years ago regarding intelligence
matters); and (4) reassign oversight responsibilities to a new joint committee.
Another consideration bearing upon these options is the periodic authorization of the
expenditure of appropriated funds by the Department of Homeland Security.
Authorizations for defense and intelligence community spending may provide useful
models.  Statutorily required periodic General Accounting Office audits of some
Department of Homeland Security programs and operations, such as customs
inspections, may also considered with a view to assisting oversight.113  The
assessment of the President’s proposal released by the Brookings Institution on July
15 devoted a chapter to the adjustment of congressional legislative, funding, and
oversight arrangements regarding homeland security and the new department.114
Legislation
S. 2452 (Lieberman)/H.R. 4660 (Thornberry).  Establishes a Department
of National Homeland Security and a National Office for Combating Terrorism
within the Executive Office of the President.  Introduced May 2, 2002, and referred
in the Senate to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and in the House to the
Committee on Government Reform.
! May 22: Committee on Governmental Affairs ordered S. 2452, as amended,
to be reported on a 7-3 vote.
! June 20: Committee on Governmental Affairs hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security with OHS Director Tom Ridge as a witness.
! June 24: Committee on Governmental Affairs report (S.Rept. 107-175) on S.
2452, as amended, ordered to be printed.
! June 25: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology,
Terrorism, and Government Information hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security.
! June 26: Committee on the Judiciary hearing on a Department of Homeland
Security with OHS Director Tom Ridge as a witness.
! June 26: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration hearing
on inclusion of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in a Department
of Homeland Security.
! June 26-27: Committee on Governmental Affairs hearings on the relationship
between a Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community.
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! June 28: Committee on Governmental Affairs hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security, weapons of mass destruction, and relevant science and
technology, research and development, and public health issues.
! July 10: Committee on Energy and Natural Resources hearing concerning a
Department of Homeland Security.
! July 10: Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing on a
Department of Homeland Security with Tom Ridge as a witness.
! July 16: Committee on Finance hearing on transfer of customs functions to a
Department of Homeland Security.
! July 16: Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions hearing on a
Department of Homeland Security.
! July 17: Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry hearing on a
Department of Homeland Security with Tom Ridge as a witness.
! July 24-25: Committee on Governmental Affairs began a markup of an
amendment to the text of S. 2452, authorized the chairman to withdraw the
version of S. 2452 that had been amended and ordered favorably reported on
May 22, then approved the modified amendment in the nature of a substitute
to the text of the bill.
H.R. 5005 (Armey) (by request).  Establishes a Department of Homeland
Security.  Introduced June 24, 2002, and referred to the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, and, in addition, to the Committees on Agriculture,
Appropriations, Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services,
Government Reform, Intelligence, International Relations, the Judiciary, Science,
Transportation and Infrastructure, and Ways and Means.  Recommendations of the
standing committees provided to the select committee, which began consideration of
the bill on July 15; select committee hearings commenced July 12.
! June 20: Committee on Government Reform hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security with OHS Director Tom Ridge as a witness.
! June 26: Committee on Agriculture hearing on a Department of Homeland
Security.
! June 26: Committee on Armed Services hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security.
! June 26: Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Civil Service,
Census, and Agency Organization hearing on transfer of consular affairs to a
Department of Homeland Security.
! June 26: Committee on International Relations hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security.
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! June 26: Committee on the Judiciary hearing on a Department of Homeland
Security with OHS Director Tom Ridge as a witness.
! June 26: Committee on Ways and Means hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security.
! June 27: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security, and Claims hearings on the role of immigration on a Department of
Homeland Security.
! June 27: Committee on Science hearing on a Department of Homeland
Security.
! July 9: Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing on a Department of Homeland Security.
! July 9: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and
Administrative Law hearing on administrative law, adjudicatory issues, and
privacy ramifications of creating a Department of Homeland Security.
! July 9: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security hearing on a Department of Homeland Security.
! July 10: Committee on Armed Services ordered reported, as amended, H.R.
5005.
! July 10: Committee on International Relations ordered reported, as amended,
H.R. 5005.
! July 10: Committee on the Judiciary ordered reported, as amended, H.R. 5005.
! July 10: Committee on Science order reported, as amended, H.R. 5005.
! July 10: Committee on Ways and Means order reported, as amended, H.R.
5005.
! July 11: Committee on Energy and Commerce ordered reported, as amended,
H.R. 5005.
! July 11: Committee on Government Reform considered recommendations on
H.R. 5005.
! July 11: Select Committee on Homeland Security hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security with Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary
of the Treasury Paul H. O’Neill as witnesses.
! July 12: Committee on Government Reform considered and approved H.R.
5005, as amended.
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! July 15: Select Committee on Homeland Security hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security with Tom Ridge as a witness.
! July 16: Select Committee on Homeland Security hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security with Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, Secretary of
Health and Human Services Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of
Transportation Norman Y. Mineta, and Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham,
among others, as witnesses.
! July 17: Select Committee on Homeland Security hearing on a Department of
Homeland Security.
! July 19: Select Committee on Homeland Security marked up and ordered
reported H.R. 5005, as amended (H.Rept. 107-609).
! July 25: House of Representatives began debate on H.R. 5005, as amended.
! July 26: House of Representatives completed debate and amendment of H.R.
5005 and approved the bill, as amended, on a 295-132 vote.
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